Abstract-This paper addresses a method to solve a node discovery problem in a complex network. Covert nodes which exist in a social network do not appear in the records which are observed on the communication or collaborative activities among the nodes. Discovering the covert nodes refers to identifying suspicious records in which the covert nodes would appear, or suspicious nodes which would be the neighbors of the covert nodes, if the covert nodes became overt. The mathematical model is developed for the maximal likelihood estimation of the network and for the identification of the suspicious records and nodes. Precision, recall, and F value characteristics are demonstrated with the test dataset generated from network models (real organization and mathematical model). The performance is close to the theoretical limit for any target covert nodes, network topologies, and network sizes if the ratio of the number of the observed data to the number of the possible communication patterns is high.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OVERT nodes in an networked organization are the persons who exist in a social network including many individuals and sub-organizations, but do not appear in the records which are observed on the communication or collaborative activities among the nodes. Discovering the covert nodes refers to identifying suspicious records in which the covert nodes would appear, or suspicious nodes which would be the neighbors of the covert nodes, if the covert nodes became overt. This problem is called a node discovery problem.
Where is such a problem encountered ? Globally networked clandestine organizations such as terrorists, criminals, or drug smugglers are great threat to the civilized societies. For example, terrorism attacks cause great economic, social and environmental damage. Active non-routine responses to the attacks are necessary as well as the damage recovery management. The short-term target of the responses is the arrest of the perpetrators. The long-term target of the responses is identifying and dismantling the covert organizational foundation which raises, encourages, and helps the perpetrators. The threat will be mitigated and eliminated by discovering covert leaders and critical conspirators of the clandestine organizations. The difficulty of such discovery lies in the limited capability of intelligence and surveillance. Information on the leaders and critical conspirators are missing because it is often hidden intentionally by the organization.
This paper develops a method to solve the node discovery problem. Related works in social network analysis, complex networks, mining and inference in the networks are described in II. The mathematical model is developed for the maximal likelihood estimation of the network and for the identification of the suspicious records and nodes in III. A few network models to generate the test dataset are introduced in IV as a preparation for the performance evaluation in V. Performance characteristics of the developed method are demonstrated in V. Application and future works are presented in VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The social network analysis [6] is a study of social structures made of nodes (individuals or organizations) which are linked by one or more specific types of relationship. Examples of the relationship are influence transmission in communication, or presence of trust in collaboration. It has been applied to anthropology, biology, communication studies, economics, geography, information science, organizational studies, social psychology, sociolinguistics, and sociology. Studies in complex networks [4] , [30] , [9] , and WWW search and analysis [7] , [2] are the related research topics.
Research interests have been extending from describing characteristic nature and behaviors to modeling and predicting unknown phenomena. A link discovery and node discovery are typical problems in prediction tasks. The link discovery predicts the existence of an unknown link between two nodes from the information on the known attributes of the nodes and the known links. It is one of the link mining tasks, as well as ranking and classification tasks [13] . Markov random network is a model of the joint probability distribution of random variables. It is an undirected graphical model similar to a Bayesian network. The Markov random network is used to learn the dependency between the links which shares a node [29] . The Markov random network is one of the dependence graphs [10] , [5] , which models the dependency between links. Extension to hierarchical model [17] , multiple networks (different types of relationship) [23] , valued networks (nodal attributes) [25] , higher order dependency (dependency between the links which share no nodes) [22] , and 2-block chain graphs (one set of explanatory variables and the other set of outcome variables) [24] are studied. A family of such extensions and model elaborations is named the exponential random graph [1] .
The link discovery techniques are combined with domainspecific heuristics and expertise, and applied to many practical problems. The Markov random network is applied to collaborative classification of web pages [29] . Prediction of the collaboration between scientists from the published coauthorship is studied [18] . Inference of the friendship between people from the information available on their web pages is studied [3] .
The node discovery predicts the existence of an unknown node around the known nodes from the information on the collective behavior of the network. Related works in the node discovery is limited. Heuristic method for node discovery is proposed in [19] , [21] . The method clusters the nodes in a network, and detects the relationship between the nodes belonging to different clusters which may arise from the unknown node. Clustering algorithms [31] , [14] are employed as a basic analysis tool from the view point that many social networks possess a structure of inter-connected clusters.
The method is applied to analyze the covert social network foundation behind the terrorism disasters [20] . The social network of the 9/11 perpetrators is used to execute simulation experiment. The expert investigatorfs prior understanding, insight on the terrorists' social network nature, and computational data processing are integrated. The method can be applied only to discovering the node which inter-connects clusters at the border of a cluster in clustered networks. But more theoretically rigorous approach is necessary to solve a node discovery problem in general.
Learning techniques of latent variables may be employed once the presence of a node is known. [27] studied learning of a structure of a linear latent variable graph. [12] studied learning of a structure of a dynamic probabilistic network.
[28] applied a hidden Markov model and a Bayesian network to predict the behavior of terrorists. But principled analytic approach in learning is not practical to handle real human relationship and communication observed in a social network, where much complexity appears. The complexity includes bidirectional and cyclic influence among many observed and latent nodes. It is difficult to address the influence from the observed nodes to the latent nodes.
III. METHOD
A. Observation data
A node and link in a social network represent a person and relationship. In eq.(1), δ i represents the communication or collaborative activities among persons in a social network. It is a set of nodes n j . For example, the nodes are those who joined the same mailing list.
Observable data is the communication pattern in eq.(1) minus the covert node n cvt . It is denoted by eq.(2).
The whole observation data is denoted by D in eq.(3). The number of data is |d|. Note that individual node and link can not be observed directly, but a set of nodes can be observed as a communication pattern.
The data D can be expressed by a two dimensional matrix of binary variables. The presence or absence of the node n j in the data d i is represented by eq.(4). The number of node species is given by |n|.
B. Network Likelihood
A parametric form is defined to describe the network topology and the influence transmission over the network. The influence transmission governs the possible communication patterns {δ i } which may result in the observation data D. The probability where the influence transmits from an initiating node n j to a responder node n k is r jk . The influence transmits to multiple responders independently in parallel. It is similar to the degree of collaboration probability in trust modeling [16] . Eq. (5) gives constraints on r jk .
The quantity f j is the probability where the node n j becomes an initiator. Eq. (6) is the constraint.
The parameters r jk and f j are denoted by r collectively. It is the target to estimate from the observation data set.
The logarithmic likelihood function is defined by eq. (8). The probability where D occurs for given r is denoted by p(D|r).
The individual observations are assumed to be independent. Eq.(8) becomes eq.(9).
The quantity f k|ij in eq. (10) is the probability where the presence or absence of the node n k as a responder to the stimulating node n j coincides with the observation d i .
Eq. (10) is equivalent to eq.(11) since the value of d ik is either 0 or 1.
The probability p(D|r) in eq. (9) is expressed by eq.(12).
Eq. (12) takes an explicit formula in eq. (13).
The logarithmic likelihood function is expressed by eq. (14) .
The maximal likelihood estimatorr is obtained by solving eq. (15) 
A simple incremental optimization technique (hill climbing method) is employed to solve eq. (15) . Advanced metaheuristic algorithms such as simulated annealing, or genetic algorithm [14] , [8] may be employed to avoid sub-optimal solutions. More optimal parameters are searched around the current values and updated as in eq. (16) in iteration.
The update ∆r nm and ∆f n should be in the direction of the maximal ascend of the likelihood function. It is indicated by the multiplication of the derivatives and the updates in eq. (17) .
Individual derivatives in eq.(17) are calculated by eq. (18), and eq. (19) .
C. Node Discovery
Suspiciousness of the data is evaluated by eq. (20) where g(x) is a monotonically decreasing function of x. Suspiciousness means the likeliness where the covert node would appear in the data if it became overt. Larger value means more suspicious data. Ranking of the data can be calculated from the value of eq. (20) . The k-th most suspicious data is given by
Suspiciousness of the node s(n j ) is evaluated by accumulating s(d i ) as in eq. (22) where w(k) is an appropriate weight function.
The Boolean function in eq. (22) is defined by eq.(23).
Much simpler means may be taken. The suspicious nodes are the neighbors n nbr which appear in the most suspicious data d σ(0) . It is denoted by eq. (24) .
IV. TEST DATASET
A. Network Model
Two classes of network models are employed to generate communication test dataset. The first class is a real organization. The second class is a mathematical model having several adjustable parameters.
The network model (A) in Fig.1 represents a real organization. It is global mujahedin (Jihad fighters) organization which was analyzed in [26] . The model consists of |n| = 107 persons, and 4 regional sub-networks. The sub-networks represent Central Staffs (CS), Core Arabs (CA) from the Arabian Peninsula countries and Egypt, Maghreb Arabs (MA) from the north African countries, and Southeast Asians (SA). The organization has a relatively large Gini coefficient (G = 0.35) in the nodal degree [11] , and a relatively large average clustering coefficient ( C i = 0.54) [30] . In economics, the Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of income distribution or of wealth distribution (0 ≤ G ≤ 1). A lower Gini coefficient indicates higher equality. The coefficients mean that the organization possesses hubs and a group structure.
The node n CS10 (indicated by a red circle) is a hub having relatively large nodal degree (D CS10 = 8). It is believed to be the founder of the organization, and said to be the covert leader who provides operational commanders in regional subnetworks with financial support in many terrorism attacks including 9/11 in 2001. His whereabouts are not known despite many efforts in investigation and capture.
The model (A) provides with the practical implication of solving the node discovery problem. But mathematical model is more suitable than the real organization to study the extensive quantitative characteristics of the method. Here, Barabási-Albert model [4] with a group structure is used as a generalization of hubs and group structure in the model (A). The Barabási-Albert model grows with preferential attachment. The probability where a newly coming node n i connects a link to an existing node n j is proportional to the nodal degree of n j (p(i → j) ∝ D j ). The occurrence frequency of the nodal degree tends to be scale-free (f (D) ∝ D a ). In the Barabási-Albert model with a group structure, the node n i is assigned a pre-determined group attribute to which it belongs (g i ). The number of groups is |g|. The probability p(i → j) is modified to eq. (25) . Group contrast parameter η is introduced. Links between the groups appear less frequently as η increases. The initial links between the groups are connected at random before growth by preferential attachment starts.
The network models (B), (C), and (D) in Fig.2 [9] which is configured by random connection between nodes.
The topological characteristics of the models (A), (B), (C), and (D) are summarized in TABLE I. Peripherality P i , and impartiality I i of the node n i are defined by eq. (26), and eq. (27) . The distance l ij from n i to n j can be measured in hop counts along the shortest path.
The characteristics of the model (C) are the most similar to those of the model (A) in terms of largeness of the Gini and clustering coefficients. On the other hand, the model (B) is less clustered, and the model (D) is more homogeneous and less clustered. 
B. Communication model
Communication test dataset is generated from the network models in IV-A in the two steps below. Recall that, although the observation d i is different from the communication δ i because of the covert node n cvt , the difference does not affect the communication pattern itself.
• Communication patterns {δ i } are generated according to the influence transmission r jk in III-B. The communication includes an initiator node n j , and multiple responder nodes n k . An example communication is δ 0 = {n CS1 , n CS2 , n CS4 , n CS5 , n CS6 , n CS7 , n CS10 , n CS11 , n CS12 } for the model (A) in Fig. 1 .
• Test dataset representing the observation data D is generated by deleting the covert node n cvt from {δ i }.
The covert node n cvt may appear multiple times in the communication. The number of the target data to identify is given by d tar in eq. (28) .
A few constraints are assumed for simplicity in the performance evaluation in V. At first, the probability f j is assumed to be the same. It becomes a constant in eq. (29) .
Second, the value of the probability r ij is either 0 or 1. The number of the possible communication patterns is bounded (less than or equal to the number of nodes |n|). The influence transmission is bi-directional. It is represented by the condition in eq. (30) .
Using eq. (29) and eq. (30), eq. (17) becomes eq. (31) .
The search space of r jk is the hyper-cube of the edge length of 1. The dimension of the hyper-cube is the number of the independent parameters. The update needs to be in the order given by eq.(32) if the update is iterated M times.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Performance Measure
Precision, recall, and F value are used as a measure of the performance. In information retrieval, the precision p is used as evaluation criteria, which is the fraction of the number of relevant data to the number of the all data retrieved by search. The recall r is the fraction of the number of the data retrieved by search to the number of the all relevant data. The relevant data refers to the data where d i = δ i . They are given by eq.(33), and eq.(34) The number of the retrieved data is d ret . The data is retrieved in the order of d
The F value F is the geometric mean of precision and recall. It is given by eq.(35). The precision, recall, and F value range from 0 to 1.
The theoretical limit (the upper bound of the performance) of the precision, recall, and F value are given by eq.(36), eq.(37), and eq.(38). The F value F T takes the maximal value of 1 at d ret = d tar . Largeness of the value of F (d tar ) can be a typical performance measure.
The random retrieval limit of the precision, recall, and F value are given by eq.(39), eq.(40), and eq.(41). They are regarded as the lower bound of the performance. The F value takes the value of 
B. Result
The results of the performance evaluation using the test dataset in IV-B derived from the network models in IV-A are demonstrated.
Let's start with the first class of the network models (real organization) and learn the implication of the method. Fig.5 shows the precision (p), recall (r), and F value (F ) in the trial where the node n CS10 in the model (A) is the target covert node (n cvt ) to discover. The horizontal axis is the rate of the number of the retrieved data (d ret ) to the number of the whole data (|d|). The vertical solid line indicates the position at d ret = d tar . The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit (upper bound) and the random retrieval limit (lower bound). The evaluation is under the condition where the all possible communication patterns are known.
The precision, recall, and F value are the same value of 0.78 at d ret = d tar . These are much better than those of the random retrieval (F R = 0.04) and close to the theoretical limit. The method fails to discover two suspicious records δ i ={n CS10 , n CS11 }, and {n CS10 , n CS12 } when d ret is small. This indicates that the communication with the nodes having small nodal degree (D CS10 = 1, and D CS12 = 1) does not provide much clues for node discovery. On the other hand, d σ(0) calculated from eq. (21) included all the neighbor nodes n CS1 , n CS2 , n CS4 , n CS5 , n CS6 , n CS7 , n CS11 , n CS12 . The method succeeded in discovering most of the suspicious records and the all suspicious nodes. The investigators will decide to collect more detailed information on the communication and collaborative activities regarding the suspicious nodes (n nbr ). This will result in identifying, locating, and finally, capturing the covert leader (n cvt = n CS10 ) who is responsible for many terrorism attacks.
Let's move on to the second class of the network model (mathematical model with adjustable parameters) and study the extensive performance characteristics of the method. Fig.6 shows the F value F (d tar ) as a function of the nodal degree D. Individual plots shows the F value averaged over the trials where the node n i having a given nodal degree D i = D is the target covert node (n cvt ) to discover. The solid line graphs (a), (b), and (c) are for the model (B), (C), and (D). The broken lines indicates the theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit. The evaluation is under the condition where the all possible communication patterns are known in Fig.6 through Fig.8 . The resulting F value ranges from 0.7 to 1. It does not depend on the number of groups (or topology of the network model). The performance becomes better as the nodal degree of the target covert nodes increases. Fig.7 shows the F value F (d tar ) as a function of the number of groups |g| in the trial where the largest hub is the target covert node (n cvt ) to discover. The horizontal axis is |g|/|n|. The number of the nodes is constant (|n| = 201). The group contrast parameter is fixed at η(|g| − 1) = 400 regardless of the value of |g|. The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit. The F value degrades down to 0.7 around |g| = 0.5|n|. But the performance still remains much better than that of the random retrieval. The method can be applied for any value of |g|. as a function of the number of nodes |n| in the trial where the largest hub is the target covert node (ncvt) to discover. The number of the groups is constant (|g| = 1). The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit. Fig.8 shows the F value F (d tar ) as a function of the number of nodes |n| in the trial where the largest hub is the target covert node (n cvt ) to discover. The number of the groups is constant (|g| = 1). The broken lines indicate the theoretical limit and the random retrieval limit. Except the case |n| = 50, the performance remains constant. The method can be applied for large networks. Note that several hours of calculation is necessary with a standard personal computer when |n| approaches to 1000. The size of the network is limited by the amount of calculation rather than by the accuracy obtainable from the method. Fig.9 shows the F value F (d tar ) as a function of the number of the observed data |d| in the trial where the node n 0 in the model (B) is the target covert node (n cvt ) to discover. The horizontal axis is the ratio of |d| to the number of the possible communication patterns |n| as assumed in IV-B. The ratio was VI. CONCLUSION This paper defined a node discovery problem in a complex network, and developed a method to solve the problem. The method estimates the maximal likelihood network, and identifies the suspicious records and nodes. Precision, recall, and F value characteristics were close to the theoretical limit for any target covert nodes, network topologies, and network sizes for the test data set generated in the network models (real organization and mathematical model with adjustable parameters). In the investigation of clandestine organizations, the method aids the investigators to identify the suspicious records in which the covert leader or critical conspirator would appear, or suspicious persons who would be their neighbors, if they became overt.
Three issues are planned to be addressed in the future works. The first issue is to overcome the restriction where the performance degrades unless the ratio of the number of the observed data to the number of the possible communication patterns is high. The second issue is to extend the models for communication or collaborative activities. The model in this paper represents the radial influence transmission from an initiating node to multiple responder nodes. In real networked organizations, other types of influence transmission are present such as serial (chain-shaped) influence transmission, or treelike influence transmission. The third issue is to develop a method to solve the variants of the node discovery problem. Discovering fake nodes, or spoofing nodes are also interesting problems to uncover the malicious intentions of the organization. A fake node is the person who does not exist in the organization, but appears in the observation. A spoofing node is the person who exists in the organization, but appears as a different node in the observation.
The developed method may also be applied to text document analysis, or WWW structure analysis as well as the social network analysis. Something unknown, which is not stated explicitly, my be detected in these applications. The discovered covert nodes may provide with a clue to approach the hidden intention of the author, an emerging opinion which is about to crystallize, or a sign of trends. The node discovery problems in a complex network are encountered in many areas in business and social sciences. The method will establish a new methodology for discovery, beyond the limit of the
